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Summary
:
This paper develops a nanaj^erial discretion nodel for non-profit public sector
Institutions and uses it to test for sources of inefficiency in non-instruction
expenditures ijithin hlj^her education, higher student costs can mean higher quality
Instruction and research, but since they are also associated \j±th declining percentages
spent on instruction, it is of interest to llcnou iiore about v;hether this extra
discretionary revenue is used to improve quality or is used less efficiently. A
theoretical solution is presented for a non-profit public sector aana^ierial discre-
tion model that shous that less efficient outcop.es can be expected xxhen there is an
administrative expense bias. Using USOC data for 60 land grant institutions, and
controlinfT for quality by usinjr quality measures fro!^ the Gourman T.eport acd from
ACc ranlcinr-.s, loT;er quality institutions and institutions uhose programs lost national
ranking are found to exhibit a statistically significant administrative expense bias,
uhereas higher quality institutions, and institutions uhos-a programs gained national
ranking, do not shox; this tendency.

THE UNIVERSITY AS A NON-PROFIT DISCRETIONARY FIRM
Charles T. Strein and Walter W. McMahon*
This paper develops a managerial discretion niodel to analyze and
test for the existence of an administrative expense bias in institutions
of higher education.
Since American universities are facing a continuing financial crisis,
identifying sources of inefficiency becomes important for the overall
well being of higher education and the survival of individual institutions,
This financial crisis has developed partly because of reduced public sup-
port compared to the 1960 's 5 and partly because of cultural and demo-
graphic changes soon to produce reduced student enrollments in this re-
cently expanded sector of our economy.
The hypothesis tested in this research is that administrative ex-
pense in a university system is a function of discretionary revenue.
Discretionary revenue is defined as that part of the current operating
budget over and above that required to maintain the minimum quantity and
quality of activities acceptable to the governing agencies. Hence the
funds are accessible to managerial discretion.
The method of analysis involves estimating discretionary revenue,
and then entering the estimate of discretionary revenue as an additional
explanatory variable in a cost function designed to explain adiainistra-
tive costs. Testing the hypothesis involves testing the sign and statis-
tical significance of the coefficient of discretionary revenue.
The early literature on this subject has its origins in work by
0. E. Williamson (1967), who developed a managerial discretion model
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for private sector entrepreneurial finas. L. Southwick (1967) and D.
Verry and B. Davies (1976) treat the university as a non-profit firm,
but assume the goal of the university is to maximize production, the
quality of that production, or some acceptable trade off between quality
and quantity. A. J. Culyer (1970) suggests introduction of a utility
function as a basis of analysis, and Lea (1975) suggests the goal of at
least certain universities may be to maximize the quality of the insti-
tution and focuses on this as a possible source of waste.
A large amount of literature deals with the broader question of ef-
ficiency in universities and with "the efficient allocation of resources"
as a budgeting problem. But this literature implicitly assvunes away
any independent "managerial motivation" as a source of inefficiency.
The approach in this paper is new in that it rel:i2:es the assumption cnat
the goal of the university is to use its resources so as to r-aximizs
quantity and/or quality, and instead postulates "mar^gerial motivation"
similar to that found in private firms as a source of resource misallo-
cation. For public institutions which are bronchas of state government,
some of the functions of the chief administrative officer and hence some
of the postulated "managerial mo-'ivation" are increasingly centralizing
in the staff of the multi-camp as university system and the staff of the
state boards of higher education. This does not imply a priori, that
this reduces or increases administrative bics however. It may help to
police more localized administrative bias, but simultaneously require a
larger administrative staff to do the increased reportiiig required. The
latter is a commonly heard explanation offered for increasing admin-
istrative costs by the institution's administrative officers. "
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The source of expenditure and enrollment data In this study Is pri-
marily cross section data from the U.S. Office of Education data for all
68 Land-Grant institutions for the years 1958-59 through 1962-63. This
period and these institutions were chosen because the data can be related
consistently to several available indices of quality and changes in
quality during this period. The sample of 68 institutions also contains
wide variations in the characteristics of importance; that is, variation
in quality as measured by the indices, in administrative costs per student,
and in research expenditure. In addition, the set of 68 institutions
provides information on the behavior of administrative expense In the
institutions where quality has declined as compared to institutions
where quality has improved. The measures of perceived quality used in
the study are 1) the Gourman measure of quality (1967) and 2) the
National Ranking of Universities (1964, 1969) produced by the American
Council on Education.
Following the development of the model and the empirical results,
some conclusions are drawn, and some tentative suggestions are offered
concezming the reasons for quality improvement.
.
.
-•
I. The University as a Firm: The Model .'
An overview of the model and the research design can be obtained by
considering the average cost curve of a vniversity, after which we will
turn to the specifics of the full spacification and solution of the for-
mal theoretical model.
An Overview
The average total cost curve for an efficient iiniversity is shown
as C/Q C/Q in Figure 1, defining the mlniminn possible average cost for
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each enrollment level at a given level of quality. It is the ustial aver-
age cost curve assumed by econoalsts, and offers a clear average cost
perspective on the problem even though the actual cost functions will
be estimated In total cost terms at a later point in this paper. A
family of less efficient average cost curves exist lying above and to
the right of C/Q C/Q, each one of which is associated with a higher level
of discretionary spending. This additional discretionary spending may
be used to Improve the quality of instruction and research at the insti-=
tution, which is useful. Or it may merely represent inefficiency in a
variety of forms.
C/0 C/Q
Average
Total
Cost as
a Func-
tion of
Enroll-
ment
! •
ic/Q
Enrollments
Figure 1
The Average Cost Functicn for a University
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An econometric estimate of the average cost function for a set of
universities of similar types with similar missions will yield the C/Q
function, and not C/Q. Each university system, illustrated by points such
as C^t C-, or C„, if it optimizes subject to an objective function that
includes quality improvement and/or administrative expense bias lies on
a different higher average cost curve in Figure 1 with different levels
of discretionary spending. The error term, which can be measured by
(C. - C.)/Q for the ith university as measured vertically along the
estimated function, provides an estimate of the spending over and above
the minimum required per student at each enrollment level. If this
A
spending should range from to 50, for example, the measure (C. - )/Q
will range from -25 to +25 and capture on a different scale the magnitude
of spending over and above the minimum required.
The hypothesis that administrative expense is a function of dis-
cretionary revenue can be tested by entering the resulting estimate of
A
total discretionary revenue (i.e., (C - C )/Q multiplied by Q) as an
additional explanatory variable in the following cost function designed
to explain not total cost, but only administrative costs, where Eq, (1)
is the total cost version of the administrative cost function:
(1) C^ = C^ {Q, R, r, (C^ " C^), u}
where:
C, = administrative costs,
A
Q = enrollments as a measure of output,
R = expenditures on organized and sponsored research as
a proxy for an additional quantity of output (e.g.,
a Q term) and/or one aspect of quality,
r = a vector of input prices, and
-6-
(C,-C.) = au astimate of total discretionary spending.
u » a disturbance term, including maasurement errors (since
. •.
.
there are not identical accounting procedures and defin-
itions at all institutions)
.
C. in this study is limited to central administrative expense and
does not Include departmental administration because of limitations In
published data. If the coefficient o.^ CC, - C.) is positive and statls-
tically significant, (C - C.) will help to explain C .
With this introduction to the approach, we now turn to the more
formal theory of a man-^gerial discretion model and Che explanation of
behavior in non-profit universities.
The Model, vt-
i!^; .Equation (2) is a possr'ble production function for the university:.,
system, where IL. is t'ue. set of non-administrative academic inputs and
K^ is. the set of adminis tratl-7i?i inputs. ....;.••-
- -'.'-3. :
..
.
'
(2) Q ?!-Q (.Lj^, K^) . . - .:,:,;...
Two major control variables exist for a u:iiverslty decision maker, pie
first is the level of production, Q, at a pret^texnained quality level,
and the second is the use cf d: scratlcrjary revenue for quality improve-
ment or for wastefwil spanding which cin include excess administrative
costs. The latter ac'3lni-?tr.-it*.ve expc;use bias can produce an ineffi-
cient resource combinatlc.i.
Let the objectl\-a functj-a of r'ne. university be the utility function
of the chief administrative officer with £.n ac'adLnistrative expense bias.
The utility function v.s given b}' equatica (3) includes administrative
inputs, K
,
as well as out:;ut» Q, as a source of satisfaction:
(3) U = U (Q, Kp .
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With (3) as the utility function to be maximized, the Lagrangian is:
(4) L = U (Q, K2) + X (R^ - r^K^ - r2K2), Q = Q (IC^. K2)
vhere;
R is a fixed level of revenue,
o
r. is the price of academic inputs (K- )
,
r^ is the price of administrative and related inputs (K^)
«
and the constraint imposed is a zero profit constraint in the "current
fund" budget of the university .•
The first order conditions for maximization are:
iK^ 3Q • 8Kj^ ^1 "
3L 9D SO ^ 3U . f, ;
JKj 3Q 3K2 SK^
IX -= \ - ^1 ^ - ^^2 ^
One result is:
8D3U 3Q 3U 8Q
(5) "^2 30
* 3^2 3^2 3^2 3K2 ..-.:-.:
^
"
3U
.
30" " MI "^ 9U . SQ
* •''' 3Q * 3iC 3K_ 3Q * 3K^
3D
Tha.t is, since it is assumed that -r^ > 0, the ratio of the price of
administrative services, r-, to the price of academic teaching and
research inputs, r. , will be greater than the ratio of the marginal
productivities of administrative Inputs to the marginal productivity of
3Q/3K2
the other inputs, or ^-, r-„ above. This indicates a resource
misallocation.
Figure 2 below illustrates this effect in terms not of the utility
function but of the production function and isoquants. With an
"
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Academic &
Inputs
Isocost for a specific budget
?.<-"? </;•!
Admlnlstra^^e '
Inputs
Figure 2 r :' ' J^^
The Effects of a Kj Bias „^. ,
administrative input (expense) bias, a solution like that at point B will
result rather than at point A or point C which are coat mlniaizlng solu-
3Q/9K2
tions. That is, in relation to equation (5), ao/ay » ^^^ first term _
on the right hand side is the slope of the Isoquant at point E, and the
. .
second term Is the difference between the slope of the price line at
point B And the Isoquant at point B, With the solution at B, the.
.
output level will be Q. , and budget costs will be higher than the
minimum cost point for output CL at point C because of the K^
bias. .Furthermore the relative cost of adiainistratlve Inputs at
point B, relative to non-administrative Inputs, is greater than the
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ratio of their marginal products, and administrative expeases r,-K_ will
be higher than necessary.
The problem for society arises when discretionary spending fails to
increase quality but inr^tead is used to provide on-the-job satisfaction
for the decision maker. If administrative expense is in the objective
function as a source of "on-the-job" utility, the amount of discretionary
revenue available for lacreasin.n; quality will be less thaa vha.t is pos-
sible given the total discretionary revenue of the institution.
II. Estimating Discretionary Revenue and Empirical Tests for '
;(:r'' .• 'fi Administrative B J as i. ..
.
-•.:...«•
' The'estlauxta of dlecretionary revenue (C. - C.) is obtained as . . -.:•.""J X i
the "residual from a total cost furction. Three estimates will be- obtained,
and then't'hfe si,!;,-nifica;'Cie of all three of these estimates of discretionary
revenue will be tested separately iu a cost function designed to explain
only total ad:ainistrative costs: j' ••...•: -
C6) C^ =
^A^^' ^» ^' ^'^i ~ V^ ''^»
which is the same as Equation (1). . ^ -. • ..:..•..
Three E3ti3!at£3 of Di '-cretionary Revcr.ua
The total ccst fu-uctlou estimated uses cross section data for 68 insti-
tutions and generates Lhc err^f term (C - C) for total discretionary
revenue (from which a- ^ra^a dlj'cretionary revenue per student can be
calculated if desired). It is:
t :>•;:«-.
-10-
(7) C = C(U, G. R, Q, r^, r^,)
Here:
C *= total costs, measured as total current fund expenditures,
U « undergraduate student enrollment (FTE)
,
G = graduate student enrollment (FTE),
R » organized research expenditure, all from U.S.O.E. (1959-65).
Q = quality of ths„ institution as laeasured by the 1957
Gourman Index, from Gounaan (1967),
r- » average faculty salaries, as given by AAD? data, and
Tj •» average clerical and other administrative salaries (an index).
This cost function was estiicated first vd.th the results as shown in Eq.
(8) at the top of Table 1, and then in a different functional foria with
the results as shown in Eq, (9) and (10) in Table 1 to obtain three
estimates of that discretionary revenue potentially available for admin-
istrative costs.
The measures of output (U, R, and Q = G + U) were all qtiality-
weighted in Eqxiation (8), treating Q and r^ as indices of quality. In the
3
results shown, to reduce heteroscedasticity, all of the terms in Eq, (8)
*7ere divided by »^. This step was not necessary however in equa-
tions (9) and (10) , which are a modified specification of the cost
functions estimated by limited information single equation Xl-ISE) and
two stage least squares methods. The two stage least sqiiares estimates
specify and estimate a demand side, (consisting of a demand for under-
graduate enrollments, for graduate enrollments, and for research that
are not the focus of this paper and Involve detail that will not be
reported here). They provide a check against the possibility that
the simultaneous nature of the economic relations involved might yield
baised estimates of the coefficients in the cost function that could
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invalidate the results. The coefficients of the significant variables
are all positive as expected. All are highly significant, except for
graduate enrollment G/U in Eq. (9) and (10), which is multicollinear with
research, R. The goodness of fit measures are satisfactory. The resid-
uals from these three equations provide three estioates of discretiotiary
revenue
.
The Administrative Cost Function Containing Discretionary Revenue
These three estimates of discretionary revenue then were inserted
one at a time in the total adiziinistrative cost function shown in £qs.
(11-13) in Tahle 1 and repeated here for easy reference as Eq. (14) :
(14) C^ - b^j + bj_ QQ + b^ RQ+ b^ r^^ + b^ r^ + b^ (C^-C) + u^^
Eere
C. = administrative costsA
QQ *» total graduate and undergraduate enrollment, multiplied
- by the 1967 Gourman Index of quality,
RQ = research including a reflection of its quality,
r. *» the average faculty salaries, and
r_ - clerical wages, not including administrative salaries.
The result of these administrative cost function regressions in
Table 1 is that all three measures of discretionary revenue are a sig-
nificant determinant of administrative costs, even after the additional
steps shown above have been taken to control for quality.
Next the sample is reorganized into fifteen sub-groups containing
more homogeneous types of institutions, with the results shown in Table
2. The more detailed results for all coefficients in the administrative
cost function are sho'.vn in Table 3. They are ranked in both Tables
according to the size of the t-statistic for the coefficient for discre-
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tlorary revenue. because- of Che varying sample s±ze, the t-statistic
raiikinj^ yielcs only an aj;prcxiirxite ranking of the institutional sets
that make up thf table. Ti:e ranVint;, cf the I'lCta coefficients however
is air.cst exactly the si^me. Tne ciscreticrary revenue residuals, are
utiiizec in each, case from the totol cost functicu that 2'ielcea the
best neasure of ^ocdnecs of fit as Eieasured by the standard error of
the estiiuate cividec bv the nean of the dependent variable.
liigh Variance Lo\.- tjuality In:- titutions with I'h.I). Programs
A positive and significant coefficient for discretiorxary revextue
sut,sestfi that discretionary revenue is spent for administrative e3:perses,
and is taker, as evidence of an adrJ-nistrative expense bias in the
university's objective function. The set cf lover quality institutions
vith i'h.i;. prcgr.iiTifc vhich rank first in Table 2 exhibit the strongest
evidence consistent with th.e h>poth.esis that an adcinistrative expense
bias exists in the utility functicn of the decision maker. A relevant
cocparisor. is the evidence from the set of higher quality institutions
th
with i'h.l). programs, vhich rank 12
—
- on the list. The t-statistic for
this set, i.bj is not sijj,nif leant at the 5 percent level given the degrees
cf freedon. present. >- distinct beh.avicral cJifference exists bet\veen per-
ceived lower quality i-nd higher quality institutions in this category
cf Ph.D. producing irrtltuticns Wi-ere the production functions are likely
to be tfirLilar, Ttiii. eviuenoe is consistent vith the contention that the
pursuit cf the utility ci higher adninis trative salaries and larger ad-
ir.inistrsUivt costs drav.-ir fiinc't: auay that could otherwise be used to sup-
port research and inno\at:ion£ th.at contribute to higher qualitj- instructicn.
and research cur.putii.
-Ib-
In additicn to the difference in the power of discretior-^ry revenue
to explain administrative costs, the difference in the goodness of fit
cf Che total cost functions shovs an interesting contrast. The measure
SEK/Y for the total cost function for institutions with Vh.U. programs
of lov/er quality is .162, vhile the same measure for the higher quality-
set is 0.0669. That is, the cost function appears to explain the behavior
of costs for the higher quality set better than for the lower quality set
which has a larger unexplained residual. One possible reason for better
explanation of cost patterns in the higher quality set is inore systematic
behavior, i.e., better Eianagecent of the higher quality institutions.
It is reasonable to expect that higher quality institutions attract and
retain more able administrators.
Groups 2-5
The set of institutions local in scope rank second and fourth in
Table 2, while those institutions with Agricultural programs rank third
and fifth. But these groups generate administrative costs for reasor^s
that are not closely related to an administrative expense bias. The
local in scope institutions tend to be smaller and therefore fail to
fully realize all possible economies of scale. Colleges with Agricul-
tural programs on the other hand have extra administrative costs gen-
erated by public service activities through their agricultural extension
services that are above and beyond the costs of their instruction and
research activities.
-17-
In iv er K iv ies VI.o.j e 1 rr.j^rar.'i:- tcjt rU. t--iri;£.l Ranking
Appeariui.- : .":^cr: in Tahlt 2 ic cr-.rt bf.t of irj;: titut-ioiif^ vrhost:
prc;-rair,.s lost nr.ticfil rarl-iz:^ Ct.-tvricn i^l.', dx.C li'hS. This '^et and
the par'sile.l set ul.c^i^ ijrc!_,rt:r;t ^ainc-.c' untlcnal irankir.g bt;twut-.n 396^
ax.vi l^f>y (rariiri crircctntv. in tr.t: tahir) p:ovidc th-^ ir.obt revealing,
result. The L-statiatio. is 3.(; i"ex thoie that lest rar.kir.j;^, and is
net statistically isigrlticar.t at the j ptrce.nt le.vt;! fcr these that
gaincJ; raticr.ai ranking. IM;. is con.: is tent vith the hypothesir. that
there is a c/ncice botuor.n sfeniiir.c c'it',ci£ticr.ary fcaUs on additional
aduinistri^tivc. (.;;pijni;f and v.sint, tb.^ir to improve the quality ct thti
instruction and research. It is net ronsistt.nt vith the hypothcj-is
that the quality cL the institution it- inpioved by ir.creaaes in adiuin-
i.strativa expense.
The: ch.an;;!; Lr the rational ranking is talton here as an indication
cf quality chance. There iray be tcr..c veakness ir this assuitptlon.
The average quality ct all irstitutiens probably iniproved between 19t)4
and 1969. The result is an institution U!a.y have loj,t national ranking
vithcut Icv'erj'ni;^ tht qualit], c£ its sctivitzes. It the university
failed to increase it:-: cuaiity at a rate equal to the national average it
v'ouJd lct:e naticial rankirj^,. Tiiero Is. nevertheless a si{;nificcnt dif-
ference betx.eei that set cf inst it-^ticns ',;hcse proj'r.r^'r.is gained naciciial
rankinr and ti;-:.t s;et '.^hoi;e prcp.rar.L- ics-c national ranking loth in the
greater ii^pc.rtai-.ce cf res.earch (c = . o7) in the fcm.er ^rcup and in the
nor(. limited u.sc of discretionary r!'\cnue for cLdr.;inistration. This
result is ccnsi-tent with the hypothesis that uhr.t;e that have fallen in
-18-
stsiure have rot used diftcretier.arj rtvvor.ues to imprcve (juslity but have
instead uned fund'". Ic-st ef f icit-ntlv on a>.!r:ir.i£ trative expenses.
Ir.gtntuticns whe re the Faci-lt y Ualxiec or Lci-t National Kankiug
Ths reverie order ai,;pcars for thi- iustituticnt vhose faculty [,aiiied
in r.p.ticiial ranking (Rani- 11) anc. thoitf whose faculty lost r-atiorial ranking
(Kark 15). Ik-vvcver both cf ^h^sc £roupti arc veil toward the botton of
Table 3 ar.d therefcrt display evjdtr.ce of a lesii significant adcinistrative
e>'pen£e bias. (The t-srar.iutics are 1.9 and ,7 re&pectivsly ar;d the Betas
are small ccnpared tc thcst Scct: touarc the top cf t\\e table. The dif-
ference between those two ^roup'S is r.rat in tViose ir.stitutica£ whose
faculty gaj'ned national ranking, jliere wts a closer astcciatior cf admin-
istrative fcxpcnse \ith research (in Line 11, Table J, •. = .Hb and t = 7.9)
than with enrolju;entp (t" = .t.'i and t = .2). Uc-search was relatively lefc
ir.pcrtant (p = .^J in Lint; 15) ar.c enrol Ir.ent relatively uore important
(f." - .tl) in those jr.KtitULi.cns where t};e faculty fell behind in its
national rackinji.
IJedical Schcols
Medical fichccls are a scr.ewhat different breec, as were agricultural
prcgranis as noted above, lledical prc^raKs national in scope do shew evi-
dence of scEe ndizinislrative expense bi-t; (Lire 7, Table J, where for
discretionary revenue t = 2.?), whereas: these Iccai in scope do not (Lino
lA) . However for the lattc-.r group faculty salaries are of overwnclming
t;i;inificance (hi = 2.02^ the ln'^gcsz iv Table J and t = i.U) . This is
likely to be affected by t;;e need to ':;c::.petc for fsculty with the hij^h
incoir.es reccivec by practicing physiciar:r, and the spill-over effect of
n; '-0
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t-his on the eaior-'es paid adreinitLratcrsL ir. Iccc.lly-criP-^tcd ntcical
scr.tjcxi;
.
Results for tht. fiili K^-irpie, v/irhciL parficipat iny in thr. various
(overla[.ping) dirt'-jr^si cnr ajacv.'rsed i'.ppccr jr. cbouc the I'iacle at rank
nunber r;ine ir. labJe 3. Since tiic t-^-^tritisuic is 2.1, there is a
significant csicciarion between discroticiiciiy rf.ver,ut and adiriuistracivc
exT'-erse. in che entirt sai:cl<=; typical cf a i:.ore general protieu.
III. CorcluL-icn.'--.
A new theorotical "cdel of the uiiivcrsity an a ncn-profit discre-
ticnar^. fim baf beou specified, and a solution presented tb^at demon-
strates the nature cf adr:ini£trativc eypcrse bias. The n'Gdel suggests
an hypothesis useful to the analysis of efficjei'cy. Ine introduction
cf adniinistr? t:ve inputs into the objective function leacs to sone
iroplicaticns for f^ctiirdstrative costs thi:t hf.ve empirical significance.
Lover quality, Iccai in scope, Ph.D. producing institutions show a
strong, static ticuily significant adroinistrative expense prcblcn, for
f.^tacple, v/hiie hij^her quality, national in scope, Ph.D. producirg insti-
tv.cicni dc not. Lc:i'^il> ir^pcrtant, thai, subset of institutions whose
pro;-r.iT>£ fc;ll in n?t"ci't.l ranking display a statisticaiiy sif^nificant
adtiinistrativc expense bias, \-hile the subset cf institutions vhcse pre—
t.ran.s j-ained ir. national ranl-.ins co rot.
These institutions v,i-c:te faculty rose cr fell in natioi-ai rankin;^
did net display £i>;^nif icar.t administrative expense bias in cither case.
-12-
but nlicse uhceo iJtatus j.rptovec did oA.ou a cJcscr <:SiCciatior. cf admin-
iscrscivc expenses vLtV. it:st:crch Lhar. vitri enicllLif.nuS. Kcdical schools
diapiayed c sonie'-hau ciifcxer-t pattrrii, displaying, the closest, relaticii
of faculty salaries to aJninisri-iit ive cy.pense, esptclally in the Kore
locally-oriented EPdict;! schrcls.
The results cvrrall Ltr.d to be inconsisterit v.ith th.e siaiple argutient
that mere .idir.ir.iEcraCive inputs per fie wi.ll irr.prcve the cucility of an
institution. They are consistent instoac vith the prcpositicn thiLt there
is a tradeoff betvreen cjuality ircprcvcr:;eut and adniuistrativt exper.se-
This sugger.ts ti-at ;i ironitoring cf adrdnij-'trative expense by state boards
of hit^her educatlcr. car. be ccr.cr.cive to greater efficiency, ^.if the addi-
ticcal reporting requirements addec ai.o ntu tec costly), and that it itay
be appropriate tc seek incentives ecr.oucive tc the establishment of effi-
ciency norKS for efficient administrative expenaiture decisions by
administrators
.
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1
"^ii. J„ Culyer's (1?7C) vorr differs froti this analysis ir. that it
H'ereiy suggests that the administrator's utilit}' fauction Eay include
"pretty secretaries and solid valnuc desks." It dees not specify and
solve a specific modsi, nor present empirical tests,
'"The Gounnan index of quality is a sur^/cy of "reliable opinions"
as describee in .T. Courx'inn (1C67) iraendc-.d to indicate the relative
overall quality of institutions and tlieir programs,
3
tvhen this tunction vas estiirated v-ithcut doing this, the error terms
got larger as enro3 lii'.tr.t get largfcT. /vfter dividing by »'Q, the scatter
dii-graES vere checked again and it did reduce the effect. Hetereoscedas-
ticity is no problem in the TSLS and USE estirsates, but a similar pro-
cedure vas folloved for the OLE estinates given in Table 1 for Eq, (lA-
16), This should be kept in irdrd vhen interpreting the results.
'The demand side estimated sinultanccusly with Equation (12) for each
of the fifteen univer.«;it> groups consists cf three parts, coT.priaing
t. deiiiand for each of the three majcr outputs, as foi'iovs:
Undergraduate Enrcllir.ent Pemand: U - U(p,
, p., ^ p.., i, i^, P, C)
Graduate EDrollEent het'.snd: C/V ^ C/U (p^ , p,, Y, V, S, C)
r:t;so£rch Dennnd: R = F.(G/i:> Q, r, . r^, C)1
' ^
t^, r, , «nd r^ are dtflrrd f.lcvt;. The c.'l:vr rrxcger.cus varf.sbjes are:
P-,
- tuitnor zv^d foe "prnce." ar: t-r.'l. uriversity, (ircn; tht in.stirutior.)
,
p,_,
- rocc ar.d ho.ivc r,hsr;/e, (tcth 'rcn ^:. Trvin (IS60)),
P., = fcri^.f,rre- ocniir.vrt-, rsrir.ar.td a;; the vagi-: cf high school
grcdiiatct: for the sta '.-:. iri f^;-;':!; tht university." i5 Iccct&d,
Y = real per c:ipiti» ;vr.ccm& lor the j^tate in vliich the schccl is
iccatcd,
A = ability as re^Fured by ave-/.igu ACT test scorer:, fcr Ciich
universit-y,
P = propurrlov. of i:hr populatic-ri In the 20-2^ college nge bracket
by states J frci'' the- U.S. Ccr.sus Bureau (.1960),
C = t£tal ccr.ts of i\Ii cutputr., ircluding i:iidergraduace enrcllir:ents
(U)
,
grsdiiste enrcllKents (G) > err? rcstarch outputs (U) treasured
at ccstj and
S = the A^tiii (1971) Selectivit\ 7r.de.:- for each university.
.M/r'/42



